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Gundred and Nebb: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
UNITED STATES v. SIMPSON: DUE
PROCESS AND INFORMANTS STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
1. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Simpson, l the Ninth Circuit held that
the FBI's recruitment and use of an informant who subsequently
engaged in sexual relations with the defendant was not so
"shocking to the universal sense of justice" as to amount to outrageous government conduct and, therefore, did not violate the
defendant's due process rights. 2
In overturning the district court's dismissal of the indictment, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the existence of the "outrageous conduct doctrine," but refused to invoke it on these particular facts. 3

II. FACTS
In 1983, Helen Miller was employed by FBI agents in their
investigation of the defendant, Darrel Simpson! The FBI suspected Simpson was dealing heroin. IS Miller was also the subject
of a then current FBI investigation.6 The agents were aware that
she was a prostitute, heroin user and a fugitive from Canadian
1. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Norris, J.; the other
panel members were Hug, J., and Hall, J.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 233 (1987).
2. Id. at 1468.
3. Id. at 1465.
4. Id. at 1464.
5.Id.
6. Id. at 1468.
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drug charges.7 Nevertheless, the agents "manipulated" Miller
into becoming an informant by promising to cease their investigation of her and to pay for her services.s
The FBI directed Miller to meet Simpson at the Los Angeles International Airport.9 She was instructed to pose as a
stranded traveler and entice Simpson into giving her a ride. 10
The district court found that Miller subsequently developed a
close personal relationship with Simpson at the instruction of
the FBI.ll In addition, the district court found that she had become involved in a sexual relationship with him which spanned
a period of over five months. 12
The district court also found that the FBI agents had instructed Miller not to get sexually involved.13 However, at some
point the FBI became aware of the sexual relationship and probably expected Miller to continue sexual relations with Simpson.14 After learning of the relationship, the FBI deliberately
closed its eyes to Miller's ongoing conduct and did not terminate
her involvement in the investigation. 11>
Sometime during the relationship, Miller introduced Simpson to FBI undercover agents posing as heroin buyers. 16 Simp7. Id. at 1464.
8. Id. at 1468-69. Although the district court's findings of fact did not specifically
state that Miller had been "manipulated," the Ninth Circuit inferred from the findings
that she had. Id. at 1469 n.6.
9. Id. at 1464.
10. Id. There was conflicting testimony presented as to what Miller was actually
instructed to do. Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union, at 10-11,
United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987)(No. 84-5301). The agents testified that they did not give those instructions. Id. at 11 n.2. Miller testified that she was
given no specific purpose. Id.
11. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1465.
12. Id. Conflicting testimony was presented regarding the actual nature of the sexual relationship between Simpson and Miller. Id. The Ninth Circuit found the precise
details immaterial. Id. at 1465 n.3. However, it appears that Miller and Simpson had sex
regularly and that Miller had a key to Simpson's apartment and spent the night there on
numerous occasions. Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union, at 13-14 &
n.14, United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987)(No. 84-5301). There was
also testimony that Miller had told Simpson that she was pregnant and that he might be
the father. Id.
13. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1467-68.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1468.
16. Id. at 1464. There was a conflict in testimony regarding how Simpson becanle
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son subsequently engaged in a heroin deal with the agents. 17 After completion of the deal Simpson was arrested and indicted. IS
The district court dismissed the indictment against Simpson after an eight-day evidentiary hearing. 19 Judge Hatter found
that the FBI violated the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment by its "offensive" conduct in recruiting and using
Miller as an informant.20 The decision was based on the finding
that the goverment's conduct, taken as a whole, was
outrageous. 21
The goverment appealed, contending that the dismissal of
the indictment was predicated upon the due process clause22 and
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. 23
involved in the heroin deal. Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union, at
14, United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d. 1462 (9th Cir. 1987)(No. 84-5301). Testimony
was introduced indicating that Miller had told Simpson that she needed money for her
child and that Simpson was reluctant to get involved. Id.
17. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1464.
18.Id.
19.Id.
20.Id.
21. Id. Judge Hatter found that three factors, taken as a whole, constituted outrageous conduct by the government: 1) The FBI's "manipulation" of Miller into becoming
an informant; 2) their continued use of Miller despite knowledge that she was a prostitute, heroin user and fugitive; and 3) their continued employment of Miller after learning of her sexual relationship with the defendant. Id. The judge held that "government
cannot be permitted to stoop to these depths to investigate suspected criminal offenders." Id. Judge Hatter also suppressed wiretap evidence on the grounds that the affidavit
submitted to authorize the wiretap contained misrepresentations and that when corrected the affidavit failed to show the necessity required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518. [d.
22. Id. Dismissal of an indictment is a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
23. [d. at 1465 n.2. Simpson contended that the trial court's dismissal was based
upon the court's inherent supervisory powers therefore making abuse of discretion the
standard of review. [d. The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention and held that the trial
court predicated the dismissal solely upon the due process clause and thus reviewed the
case de novo. Id. As a general rule,
[DJe novo review is limited to determining whether particular government behavior is or is not, as a matter of law, a
constitutional violation. (citations omitted) Because of the
trier of fact's unique advantage in seeing and hearing the presentation of evidence, we will accept as correct his or her determination of what was the particular government behavior and
what prompted that behavior, unless those factual conclusions
are clearly erroneous.
United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1986).
Since the Ninth Circuit reviewed Simpson de novo, it accepted the factual conclusions of the district court and limited review to a determination of whether the conduct
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BACKGROUND

The due process defense for outrageous government conduct
is based upon a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. 24 The defense is frequently confused with that of entrapment. 25 Although the two defenses are closely related and often·
raised together, they are independent theories. 26 Entrapment is
a judicially created defense27 which inquires into the defendant's
predisposition to commit a crime.28 In most jurisdictions proof
of predisposition will defeat a claim of entrapment.29 In contrast, however, it is generally understood that the due process
defense is available to a predisposed defendant.30 Generally, entrapment is a question of fact for the jury whereas due process is
a question of law for the judge.31 The due process defense is
based upon "fundamental fairness" and focuses primarily on the
conduct of the government. 32 Thus, the due process defense apof the government was as a matter of law a violation of Simpson's due process rights.
Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1465 n.2. Simpson, therefore, was not afforded the "abuse of
discretion" standard of review which is used when the court invokes its supervisory
power. Under this standard, the Ninth Circuit would have overruled the district court
only if it could be proved that Judge Hatter's decision was an abuse of discretion.
24. Stetson, Outrageous Conduct: A Fifth Amendment Due Process Defense, 5
CRIM. JUST. J. 55 (1981). A historical analysis of the due process defense.
25. Abramson, Lindeman, Entrapment and Due Process in The Federal Courts, 8
AM. J. CRIM. L. 139 (1980). An overview of the history and application of the defense in
the various circuits from it's inception through 1980.
26. United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983) aft'd, 723 F.2d 649
(9th Cir. 1984). For a good general discussion of due process, entrapment and their differences see generally, Mascolo, Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Conduct that
Shocks the Conscience: The Right Not to Be Enticed or Induced to Crime by Government and it's Agents, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1984) [hereinafter Mascolo]. For a
discussion of entrapment and due process, see also Park, The Entrapment Controversy,
60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1975-76).
27. For a good discussion of the history of the outrageous conduct defense, see Stetson, Outrageous Conduct: A Fifth Amendment Due Process Defense, 5 CRIM. JUST. J. 55
(1981).
28. Mascolo, supra note 26, at 25-28.
29. Id. A minority of jurisdictions observe the objective test of entrapment which
purports to focus only on the inducements used by the government agents and not on
the predisposition of the defendant. W. LAFAVE & R. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW §
5.2(c)(1986). See also 1 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code & Commentaries,
Art. 2 § 2.13 (1985).
30. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1986); See also Mascolo, supra note 26, at 25-28.
31. United States v. Stenberg, 803 F.2d 422, 428 (9th Cir. 1986); Mascolo, supra
note 26, at 25-28.
32. Mascolo, supra note 26, at 25-28. See generally P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §§ 209(b) and 210(i)(6) (1984 & Supp. 1986) and 2 J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL
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pears to be very broad. However, in the majority of the federal
courts, the degree of outrageous government conduct required
for a successful due process challenge is significant33 and more
than that which is required for an entrapment defense. 34
In United States v. Russell,35 the Supreme Court first considered the theory of the outrageous government conduct defense. 36 Russell contended that his constitutional rights had
been violated. 37 Government agents supplied Russell with the
chemical phenyl-2-propanone, a necessary element in the manufacture of methamphetamine. 3s The ingredient supplied was difficult for the defendant to obtain. 39 Russell contended that the
involvement of the government in supplying an indispensible
means to commit the crime was a violation of fundamental principles of due process.4° Russell based this argument upon the
Ninth Circuit decision in Greene v. United States,.l where the
court reversed a conviction because government agents had become so involved in the criminal activity of the defendants that
prosecution was held to be "repugnant" to the American criminal justice system.42
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 4:3 (2nd ed. 1986).
33. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978); and Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
34. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1106 (1982) (ABSCAM project. An elaborate scheme was set up to "create opportunities for illicit conduct by public officials." Held not a violation of due process
rights).
35. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
36. Id. at 427-36.
37. Id. at 430. Russell contended that the same factors that led the Court to apply
the exclusionary rule to illegal searches and seizures (deterring undesirable police conduct) should be applied in his case. Id. The Court rejected this analogy however, and
held that the principal reason behind the adoption of the exclusionary rule was the government's "failure to observe its own laws." Id.
38. Id. at 425-26.
39. Id. at 431. Although the ingredient was difficult to obtain, it was not impossible.
Id. The defendants had possessed it on previous occasions without the assistance of the
government.ld.
40. Id. at 430-31.
41. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
42. Id. at 787:
We do not believe the government may involve itself so
directly and continuously over such a long period of time in
the creation 'and maintenance of criminal operations, and yet
prosecute its collaborators. . . . A certain amount of stealth
and strategy "are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer." But, although this is not an entrapment case,
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In Greene, a government agent posed as a "gangster,"43
sought a location for the defendants' illegal still,'4 offered to furnish equipment and an operator for the still,45 supplied sugar at
wholesale prices,46 and was defendants' only customer for illegal
liquor for at least a two and one-half year period.47 In overturning Greene's conviction, the court held that such direct and continuous involvement in a criminal enterprise, over an extended
period of time, rises to the level of creative police activity and
bars the government from prosecuting its collaborators.48
Russell contended that an application of Greene to the facts
of his case would bar prosecution as a matter of law.49 The Supreme Court, however, held the actions of the government to be
less than objectionable.50 The Court noted that the government
had not supplied an indispensable means, since phenyl-2-propanone was not impossible to obtain and had in fact been obtained
by the defendant elsewhere, and therefore, Russell could not fit
into the very rule he proposed. 51
However, in his frequently quoted passage of dicta, Justice
Rehnquist noted:
While we may someday be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforcement
agents is so outrageous that due process principles would bar the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction, the instant
case is distinctly not of that breed. . . . The law
when the government permits itself to become enmeshed in
criminal activity, from begining to end, to the extent which
appears here, the same underlying objections which render entrapment repugnant to American criminal justice are operative. Under these circumstances the government's conduct
rises to the level of "creative activity".•..
43. [d. at 785
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

[d.
[d. at 785-86.
[d. at 786.
[d.
[d. at 787.
49. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 427-30 (1973).
50. [d. at 432. The Court relied on the fact that the criminal enterprise was already
in progress and that the chemical was by itself a harmless substance and legal to possess.
[d.

51. [d. at 431.
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enforcement conduct here stops far short of violating that "fundamental fairness shocking to the
universal sense of justice," mandated by the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 52

Thus, although the Supreme Court did not apply the defense to Russell, the possibility that it could be successfully
raised in the future was left open. 1I3
The outrageous conduct doctrine was clouded considerably
by Hampton v. United States. M Of the three opinions in Hampton, none was joined by a majority of the Justices. 1I11 The plurality held that a defendant's predisposition would bar an outrageous conduct defense. 1I6 The concurring opinion, written by
Justice Powell and joined by Justice Blaclanun, stated that the'
outrageous conduct defense would be available despite the defendant's predisposition.1I7 However, the Justices noted that police over-involvement in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar a conviction.1I8
The dissenting opinion,1I9 written by Justice Brennan and joined
by Justices Stewart and Marshall, also noted that Russell did
not foreclose barring a conviction based upon supervisory power
or due process principles where the conduct of law enforcement
authorities is sufficiently offensive, regardless of the defendant's
predisposition.GO Thus, a majority of the members of the Court
52. ld. at 431-32 (citations omitted).
53.ld.
54. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). Hampton was convicted of selling heroin to government
agents. ld. at 485. Testimony was in conflict as to whether the contraband was supplied
by the government's informant or defendant and whether the defendant knew it was
heroin. ld. at 486-88. The trial court found Hampton guilty, thus rejecting his contention
that the drug was supplied by the informant who said it was not heroin. ld. at 488. The
Supreme Court found that even if the government had supplied the drug, the defendant
acted in concert with the government in the sale. ld. at 490. The Court held that the due
process clause comes into play only when the government violates a protected right of
the defendant. ld. Since the government and Hampton were acting in concert, a protected right was not violated. ld. at 490-9l.
55. ld. at 485, 491, 495.
56. ld. at 490.
57. ld. at 491-95.
58. ld. at 495 n.7.
59. ld. at 495. The dissent espoused the objective view of entrapment focusing on
the conduct of the government rather than the subjective view of the majority focusing
on the predisposition of the defendant. ld. at 496-97.
60. ld. at 497.
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recognized the existence of the defense and its availability to the
predisposed defendant.
The Ninth Circuit has since repeatedly recognized the existence of the due process outrageous conduct defense. 61 Many
courts have refused to apply the outrageous conduct defense absent police brutality, where physical or psychological coercion
was employed against the defendant. 62 The Ninth Circuit has
not accepted the view that this discreet group of cases of police
brutality defines the limits of unconstitutionally outrageous government conduct. 63 However, in only two court of appeals cases
have defendants been successful in raising a due process outrageous government conduct defense. 64
In United States v. Twigg,65 the government, through an in61. In each of the following cases, the Ninth Circuit recognized the existence of the
due process defense but refused to invoke it on the facts at hand: See United States v.
Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for specific findings of fact) (fictitious
business scheme was set up by government agents to trade for cocaine); United States v.
Lomas, 706 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (government
agent was acting as "broker" for a drug sale); United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982) (government set up a fictitious company
interested in influencing politicians); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.
1980) (an essential ingredient for the manufacture of drugs was supplied by a government informant); United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978) (an informant/
prostitute was acting as a middleman to a drug sale); United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d
782 (9th Cir. 1976) (government informant was involved in a scheme to bribe county
commissioners).
62. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1954) (Fundamental fairness not
transgressed absent "coercion, violence or brutality to the person"); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2nd Cir. 1982) (arguably coercive interrogation of bribery suspect
not a violation of due process, not actual coercion); United States v. VanMaaneny, 547
F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1976) (no violation of due process where police falsified reports, advised
witness to leave town and failed to disclose the existence of an informant); United States
v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2nd Cir. 1975) (kidnapping of defendant by government not a
violation of due process); United States v. Harrison, 432 F.2d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(grabbing defendant about the throat to prevent the swallowing of drug capsules not a
violation of due process); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966) (search of
body cavity not due process violation); Belfare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir.
1966) (pumping of defendant's stomach by physician at the direction of law enforcement
officers not a violation of due process rights).
63. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986) (business scheme
set up by government agents to trade for cocaine).
64. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) and United States v.
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F.
Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (government supplied contraband and made contingent
promises to defendants).
65. 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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formant, suggested to defendants that a speed laboratory be established. 88 The government supplied most of the materials and
the informant supplied the expertise. 87 Neither of the two defendants possessed the knowledge or the materials to commit
the crime absent government involvement. 88 All actions taken by
Twigg were at the direction of the government's informant. 89
The Third Circuit held that "fundamental fairness" required reversal of Twigg's conviction due to over-involvement by the
government.70
In Greene v. United States,71 an undercover government
agent supplied sugar, offered equipment and an operator for a
bootlegging still, and was defendants' only customer for a two
and one-half year period.72 The Ninth Circuit reversed Greene's
conviction on the grounds that the government directly and continuously involved itself in the criminal operation to an extent
which was "repugnant" to the American criminal justice
system.7S
In both of these cases the government supplied the subject
contraband and participated substantially in its manufacture. In
neither case would the defendants have had the capacity to commit the crime absent government assistance.74 However, the
Ninth Circuit has expressly stated that Twigg and Greene do
not present the only situations in which the defense is
appropriate. 715

Though a clear delineation of what is and what is not outrageous government conduct has not been made, the Ninth Circuit
has recognized that law enforcement conduct becomes constitutionally unacceptable when it "shocks the conscience."78 This in66. Id. at 375. For a discussion of Twigg, see Note, Due Process When Government
Agents Instigate and Abet Crime, 67 GEO. L. J. 1455 (1978-79).
67. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 375-76.
68. Id. at 381.
69. Id. at 381-82.
70. Id. at 382.
71. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
72. Id. at 786-87.
73. Id. at 787.
74. United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 723 F.2d 649
(9th Cir. 1984) (government agent acted as "broker" in a drug transaction).
75.Id.
76. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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eludes situations where the police conduct involves unwarranted
physical or perhaps mental coercion,77 as well as where the crime
is fabricated entirely by the police. 7s
Thus, the outrageous government conduct defense is still
available,79 however, it has been narrowed considerably in its application.so What is acceptable police conduct cannot be defined
in the abstract. Every case must be resolved on its own facts. s1
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In United States v. Simpson,s2 the Ninth Circuit recognized
the due process doctrine set forth in Russell. ss The court relied
on its decision in United States v. Bogart,S4 which held that the
outrageous conduct doctrine bars prosecution of defendants only
in that slim category of cases in which the police have been brutal, employing physical or psychological coercion against the defendant. S5 The court held Miller's treatment of Simpson lacked
brutality and coercion.s6 It also noted that Simpson did not
elaim that he was physically or psychologically coerced into the
77. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (government agents
set up business scheme to trade for cocaine).
78. Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1438.
79. The due process outrageous conduct doctrine has been the subject of extensive
commentary. See generally 1 W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.4 (1984);
1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 52 (14th ed. 1978 & Supp. 1987); P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL
LAW DEFENSES §§ 209(b) and 210(i)(6) (1984 & Supp. 1986); W. LA FAVE & R. SCOTT,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(g) (1986); 2 J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED § 4:3 (2nd ed; 1986); American Law Institute, Model Penal Code & Commentaries, Art. 2 § 2.13, Part I (1985); 20 CAL. JUR.3D (Rev.) § 2272 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
80. United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1976) Informant was coerced
to set up scheme to bribe county commissioners in regard to zoning. Id. Actions by law
enforcement included: 1) Telling informant he would go to jail unless he helped; 2) telling informant not to get an attorney; 3) telling him his health would suffer if he went to
jail; 4) assuring informant that his friends would be kept out of the scheme; and 5) telling informant that if he did not help he would be indicted. Id. Held not a violation of
defendant's due process rights. Id.
81. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for specific findings of fact) The court found it impossible to draw a bright line between acceptable and unacceptable police conduct. Id.
82. 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987).
83. Id. at 1464.
84. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for specific findings of fact) (business scheme set up by government agents to trade for cocaine).
85. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1465.
86. Id. at 1466.
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relationship with Miller. 87
In Simpson,88 the Ninth Circuit traced the due process challenge to case law evolving from Rochin v. California. 89 Police officers in Rochin forced open the door of the defendant's bedroom, jumped on him, attempted to forcibly remove drug
capsules from his throat and had his stomach pumped to retrieve the drugs. 9o The Supreme Court held that the circumstances in Rochin compelled their conclusion that the methods
by which the conviction was obtained were far too offensive. 91
The government conduct complained of in Rochin, was held to
"shock the conscience."92 The Ninth Circuit noted in Simpson
that it had previously relied on Rochin in holding other physical
brutality a violation of due process.93 The court, however,
pointed out that cases have previously required a showing of coercion, violence or brutality to the person before due process is
transgressed. 94
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged "that Simpson may have
suffered severe emotional trauma and felt stripped of his dignity
upon learning that Miller's apparent affection for him was contrived."911 The court held, however, that a suspect cannot claim
government misconduct based on the use of deception alone.96
87. [d.
88. [d. at 1465.
89. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
90. Rochin, 342 U.S. 165, 166.
91. [d. at 172. Rochin was decided prior to United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1973) and Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) therefore the defendant in
Rochin did not allege the due process, outrageous conduct defense as such. Rochin was
argued primarily on a privacy theory. 342 U.S. at 173. However, the Rochin court also
focused on the conduct of law enforcement in holding that Rochin's constitutional rights
had been violated. [d.
92. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. The Court held that the proceedings by which Rochin's
conviction was obtained udo more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks
the conscience . . . . They are methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of
constitutional differentiation." [d. (Emphasis added)
93. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466. See Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir.
1968) (government agents forcibly removed narcotics from defendant's rectum).
94. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466 [quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133
(1954), and United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1983)].
95. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466.
96. [d. The court specifically stated that U[t]he betrayed suspect might feel foolish
or insulted but cannot complain of government impropriety based on the use of deception alone." [d.
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According to the Ninth Circuit, deceptive creation and exploitation of an intimate relationship is a permissible law enforcement
tactic. 97 The court held that Miller's treatment of Simpson was
short of the brutality and coercion underlying previous successful outrageous conduct challenges. 98 The Ninth Circuit noted
further that Simpson did not claim that he was physically or
psychologically coerced into developing a close relationship with
Miller. 99 Therefore, the court held that the due process clause
did not protect Simpson from voluntarily trusting someone who
turns out to be unworthy of that trust.IOO
Simpson also argued that Miller's use of sex was outrageous
as a matter of law. lol The Ninth Circuit did not agree and held
that an informant must be given substantial leeway in deciding
how to establish a relationship with a suspect. I02 The court refused to draw any line or identify any fixed point beyond which
a relationship between a suspect and informant would become
shocking. lOS The Ninth Circuit felt an attempt to distinguish
that point would require the court to draw upon social mores
and notions of human sexuality, and that such subjective application of the outrageous conduct doctrine on the part of judges
had been specifically limited by the Supreme Court.I04
Additionally, Simpson contended that Miller's illusory cultivation of emotional intimacy, combined with her deceptive use
of sex, magnified the invasion such that prosecution should have
97. Id. "We have recognized that the government may use artifice and strategem to
ferret out criminal activity, ... and to that end informants must be permitted to use
deceit by assuming identities that will be convincing to the criminal elements they have
to deal with." Id.
98.Id.
99.Id.
100.Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court held that "[t]o win a suspect's confidence, an informant must
make overtures of friendship and trust and must enjoy a great deal of freedom in deciding how best to establish a rapport with the suspect. In a particular case the informant
might perceive a need to establish a physical as well as an emotional bond with the
suspect." Id.
103. Id. The Ninth Circuit felt that "any attempt to distinguish between holding
hands, hugging, kissing, engaging in sexual foreplay, and having sex on a regular basis in
order to decide when an informant has gone to far would require [them] to draw upon
[their] peculiarly personal notions of human sexuality and social mores." Id.
104. Id. at 1466-67 [citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952)].
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been barred. 1011 The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention and
refused to draw fine lines based on the level of emotional intimacy in a particular informant/suspect relationship. lOS The
court based this decision on its holding in United States v.
Penn. 107 In Penn, the court held that government agents may
recruit family members as informants without violating due process. 10S The court in Simpson drew a parallel between family
members and lovers and stated that exploiting an emotionally
intimate relationship between lovers seems no more egregious
than exploiting an emotionally intimate relationship between
family members.l09 The Ninth Circuit noted further that courts
are not well equipped to assess degrees of intimacy and any attempt to bar prosecutions based on those degrees would lack the
universality required by the due process clause. llo Thus, the
court rejected Simpson's argument that the totality of Miller's
actions in this case was a violation of his due process rights. l l l
The Ninth Circuit also focused on the fact that Miller's conduct could not be directly attributed to the government.1l2 The
court relied on its decision in United States v. Prairie. lls In
Prairie, the court held there was no due process violation when a
paid informant had sex with a suspect without the government's
knowledge. ll4 The informant was not asked by the agents to establish any particular relationship with Prairie.llll The Prairie
court held that her official role was limited to introducing a willing seller of narcotics to a willing purchaser. u6 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit held that, since the trial court found that Miller had
been instructed "not to get involved," Miller's decision to establish the relationship could not be attributed to the govern105. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1467.
106.Id.
107. 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980).
108. Id. at 883-84. (government agent offered the defendant's 5-year old son five
dollars to show where his mother had buried heroin, held not a violation of the defendant's due process rights).
109. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1467.
110.Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978).
114. Id. at 1319.
115.Id.
116. Id.
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ment. ll7 However, the court admitted that the government's
"hands were not entirely clean."lls Once the FBI became aware
of the relationship, they expected Miller to continue and closed
their eyes to her ongoing conduct. 1l9 The court, however, found
the government's passive tolerance of Miller's conduct to be less
egregious than the conduct of government agents which is typi-'
cally present in outrageous conduct challenges.12o They felt to
decide otherwise would undermine the FBI's ability to sustain
investigations merely because an informant, on her own initiative, engaged in sexual activity with a suspect.121
The Ninth Circuit held that Miller's deceptive use of sex
was not so outrageous as to bar Simpson's prosecution.122 In doing so the court relied both on the fact that Miller's conduct was
not directly attributable to the government123 and on its refusal
to draw a line at which a sexual relationship between an informant and suspect becomes shocking. 124 Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that society may find the use of sex offensive, it
held that the government may use methods that are neither appealing nor moral when judged by abstract norms of decency.1215
The Ninth Circuit held that it is the function of the political
branches of government to regulate police conduct that offends
but which is not violative of due process.126
The Ninth Circuit also found that the government's "manipulation" of Miller into becoming an informant and the continued use of Miller despite the fact that she continued to engage in unrelated criminal activity was not violative of
Simpson's due process rights. 127
117. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1467.
118. Id. at 1467-68.
119. Id. at 1468.
120.Id.
121. Id.
122.Id.
123. Id. The court reserved judgment on the issue of whether the use of sex by an
informant would "shock the conscience" in a case where it was directly attributable to
the government. Id. at 1468 n.4.
124. Id.
125.Id.
126.Id.
127. Id. at 1468-70. On the issue of "manipulation" the Ninth Circuit held that even
if Miller had been manipulated by the government, there was no basis for dismissing
Simpson's indictment on those grounds. Id. at 1469. The court reasoned that the use of
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CRITIQUE

The Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Simpson 128,
is the latest in a long line of cases in which the courts of appeal
have considered the outrageous conduct doctrine. The opinions
are all similar in that they recognize the existence of the defense, but hold that the government's conduct is reasonable
based on the facts at hand. 129 Thus, it has yet to be clearly deinformants is common and inarguably permissible and that Miller could not be rejected
as an informant just because she was poor and vulnerable. [d. The court also held that
since it is common practice to reduce or drop charges against persons who cooperate with
law enforcement at the prosecution stage, it should be equally permissible to do so at the
investigation stage. [d. Therefore, Miller could not be rejected as an informant merely
because the government agreed to ease off their investigation of her. [d.
The court rejected the government's contention that Simpson did not have standing
to complain about the government's treatment of Miller. [d. at 1469 n.7. It held that as a
direct target of the F.B.L's investigation, Simpson had standing to complain about any
outrageous conduct on the part of the government during the investigation. [d. However,
the court held that since the use of informants is permissible and since it is common to
reduce or drop charges against them, there was no due process violation. [d. at 1469.
On the issue of unrelated criminal activity, the Ninth Circuit stated that they found
no authority in support of defendant's contention that the use of an informant who engages in unrelated criminal activity raises due process concerns. [d. at 1470.
The court, however, did affirm the trial court's finding that evidence obtained
throu"gh a wiretap of Simpson's home should be suppressed due to an inadequate showing of necessity. [d. at 1471-73.
128. 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987).
129. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for specific
findings of fact) (business scheme set up by government agents to trade for cocaine);
United States v. Stenberg, 803 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1986) (government agents purchased
illegal protected wildlife from defendants, held not a violation of due process); United
States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1986) (brother of defendant used as informant to
solicit drug transaction. This activity was held to come close but not quite reach outrageous conduct); United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1986) (no violation of
due process where government officials knew of defendants' planned prison break and
took no steps to stop it); United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1986) (government's use of mother of the defendant's child as informant not violation of due process);
United States v. Scott, 789 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1986) (no violation of due process where
government agents gave beer to defendant who had an alcohol problem); United States
v. Cole, 807 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1986) (no violation of due process where agent engaged in
sexual relationship with defendant's roommate); United States v. So, 755 F.2d 1350 (9th
Cir. 1985) (government informant involved in "money laundering" operation, provided
the funds to the defendant. Held not a violation of defendant's due process rights);
United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1985) (held no violation of due process
where paid informant arranged drug deal, agreed to give defendant money and agreed to
care for the defendant's 18-month old child when defendant, who had cancer, died);
United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985) (government informant used as
middleman in bribery scheme, held not outrageous); United States v. Puett, 735 F.2d
1331 (11th Cir. 1984) (government agents set up scheme to purchase fraudulent securities from defendant, held not a violation of due process); United States v. O'Connor, 737
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fined what conduct on the part of government would constitute
a violation of a defendant's due process rights.
Although the opinion in Simpson appears to be in accord
with decisions in both this circuit and others,130 it does raise
some serious questions about the application of the due process
outrageous conduct doctrine. The language used in the opinion
seems to state that the Ninth Circuit intends to limit the defense to cases involving brutality and coercion. 131 The court
stated that "the outrageous conduct doctrine bars prosecution of
defendants in that slim category of cases in which the police
have been brutal, employing physical or psychological coercion
against the defendant."l32 As examples of this conduct, the court
cited Rochin v. California l33 and Huguez v. United States. 134 In
both cases the conduct of law enforcement officers involved a
physical violation of the defendant's body. The court attempted
to distinguish these cases from physical violations not involving
brutality.135 The court cited Belfare v. United States,136 where
F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1984) (government agent offered cocaine as payment of debt, held not
violation of due process where cocaine was the intended form of payment); United States
v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (government
agent offered to provide cocaine and acted as a broker for sale, held not outrageous conduct); United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11 (3rd Cir. 1983) (not violation of due process
someone who wanted to
where paid informant introduced defendant to agent posing
burn a building); United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (ABSCAM: bribery of congressional members, involvment in extensive "set up" not violation of due process); United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1983) (not a violation of due
process where government agents bribed and coerced informer. Note also that defendant
argued invocation of supervisory power); United States v. Bagnariol, 655 F.2d 877 (9th
Cir. 1981) (government set up a fictitious company interested in influencing politicians);
United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980) (no violation where an essential
ingredient for drug manufacture supplied by government informant); United States v.
Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (five year old son of defendant offered five dollars to
show where his mother had buried heroin, held no violation); United States v. Prairie,
572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978) (no violation where informant/prostitute acting as middleman for a drug sale); United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976) (no violation
where informant coerced to set up scheme to bribe county commissioners). For a good
overall review of decisions prior to 1980 in the various circuits, see generally, Abramson
& Lindeman, Entrapment and Due Process in the Federal Courts, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 139
(1980).
130. See cases cited supra note 129.
131. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1465.
132. Id. at 1465 (quoting Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1435).
133. 342 U.S. 165 (1952); see text accompanying note 90.
134. 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968) see supra note 93.
135. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466.
136. 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
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insertion of a tube into the defendant's stomach to force him to
vomit was held not outrageous since it was performed by a physician and imposed a limited amount of pain on the defendant. 137 The court then held that the "requisite level of outrageousness . . . is not established merely upon a showing of
obnoxious behavior or even flagrant misconduct on the part of
the police; [due process] is not transgressed absent 'coercion, violence or brutality to the person.' "l38 Though the Ninth Circuit
recognized that Simpson may have suffered emotional trauma,139
it held that Miller's treatment of him fell short of the brutality
and coercion underlying previous successful outrageous conduct
challenges.140
It appears, therefore, that the court is limiting the defense
to situations of physical violence, coercion and brutality. However, the Ninth Circuit has previously held that these situations
are not the only instances where the defense is appropriate. l4l
The defense was also successfully raised in both Greene 142 and
Twigg. 143 These cases did not involve situations of violence, brutality or coercion. These were situations where the defendants
would not have had the capacity to commit the crime absent
government involvement. The Simpson court made no reference
to these cases. Thus, although the Ninth Circuit has specifically
stated that the defense is appropriate in circumstances other
than physical violence, the court in Simpson appears to be saying that the defense is limited to just those situations. If this is
the case, the Ninth Circuit should make clear to the district
courts its intent to so limit the outrageous conduct defense.

In holding Miller's treatment of Simpson short of the brutality and coercion needed, the Ninth Circuit relied on the fact
that Simpson was not coerced to enter into the relationship with
137. Id. at 876.
138. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466 (quoting Irvine, 347 U.S. at 133).
139. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1987).
140.Id.
141. United States V. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 723 F.2d 649
(9th Cir. 1984). See text accompanying note 129.
142. Greene V. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying
note 42.
143. United States V. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978). See text accompanying
note 65.
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Miller.144 However, the court failed to address whether Simpson
was coerced into the drug deal by Miller rather than into the
sexual relationship with her. There was evidence presented to
the court that when the drug deal was being discussed, Miller
indicated to Simpson that she needed money for her child. HI> It
appears that the court did not recognize that the intimate relationship with Miller, a known heroin user, who had set up an
emotional bond with Simpson, may have been a factor that coerced Simpson into engaging in the drug deal.
The Ninth Circuit noted that to win a suspect's confidence,
an informant must be given substantial leeway in establishing a
rapport with the suspect.146 The court stated that "in a particular case the informant might perceive a need to establish a physical as well as emotional bond with the suspect."147 The court
then reasoned that it saw no principled way to identify a fixed
point where a physical relationship becomes "shocking" without
drawing on personal notions of human sexuality and social mores, and therefore, it would not do SO.148 Thus, the court did not
determine what type of a physical or psychological relationship
between an informant and a suspect would cross due process
lines. If the standard is that law enforcement conduct becomes
unacceptable when it "shocks the conscience"149 and the Ninth
Circuit refuses to decide at what point a relationship "shocks,"
it has provided little or no guidance to the district courts as to
what type of conduct involving an informant and a suspect
would cross due process lines. The opinion in Simpson, therefore, seems to afford the government unlimited leeway to manipulate a suspect through an informant. Further, it seems that all
decisions of this nature to some extent must be a "value type"
judgment. What is considered to be "outrageous" or "shocking"
144. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1987).
145. There was evidence presented to the district court that Miller had told Simpson she needed money for her child when the drug deal was being discussed. Brief of
Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union at 14. United States v. Simpson, 813
F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987)(No. 84-5301).
146. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466.
147.Id.
148. Id. The court stated: "[W]e see no principled way to identify a fixed point
along the continuum from casual physical contact to intense physical bonding beyond
which the relationship becomes 'shocking' when entertained by an informant." Id.
149. See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for
specific findings of fact).
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will always involve the personal feelings of the individuals judging that action. Thus, an attempt to remove the human factor of
personal mores and notions of human sexuality on the part of
the Ninth Circuit is not totally possible.

..

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on its decision
in United States v. Penn/ 50 in holding that Miller's cultivation
of emotional intimacy did not violate Simpson's due process
rights. 151 The Simpson court drew a parallel between exploiting
the relationship of lovers and exploiting that of parent and
child, which was held acceptable in Penn. 152 The court in Penn
held that Penn was not entitled to a constitutional remedy for
law enforcement's intrusion into the family circle/ 53 in part because Penn's case did not involve the special intimacy characteristic of areas of sexual relation and reproduction. 154 Thus, the
court in Simpson failed to recognize that Penn itself precludes
the parallel they drew. The Ninth Circuit also failed to note the
difference between an existing relationship and one created for
the purpose of the investigation. Penn may be distinguished by
the fact that the relationship in Penn was already in existence
and the relationship in Simpson was created in order to be
betrayed.
The Ninth Circuit also relied on its decision in United
States v. Prairie,155 in holding that since Miller's conduct was
not directly attributable to the government, there was no due
process violation. 156 Prairie, however, is distinguishable on its
facts. The government in Prairie never knew of the sexual relationship between defendant and the informant.157 In Simpson,
the government agents not only knew of Miller's sexual relation150. 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir 1980). See supra note 108 for facts.
151. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1987).
152. [d.
153. United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 883-84 (9th Cir. 1980). See supra note 108
for facts.
154. [d.
155. 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978).
156. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1467.
157. Prairie, 572 F.2d at 1319. The opinion in Prairie itself does not specifically
state that the government did not know of the relationship. [d. However, it does state
that the informant was neither paid nor asked to develop a relationship with Prairie. [d.
The Simpson court drew the conclusion that the informant's conduct was unknown to
the government in Prairie. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1467.
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ship with the defendant, they expected it to continue.lISS The
Ninth Circuit addressed this point but noted that the initial decision to establish a sexual relationship was Miller's.169 The
court considered the passive tolerance of Miller's conduct to be
less egregious than the conscious direction of government agents
typically present in outrageous conduct" challenges.16o However,
the court failed to cite any cases where conscious direction of an
informant was present. The Ninth Circuit should have addressed itself to the actions of the government in this case. The
government created at least some sort of a relationship between
Miller and Simpson and then "closed its eyes" to the sexual nature of the relationship.16l The government's "passive tolerance"162 of the relationship was tantamount to encouragement.
Instead of denouncing the actions of the government, the opinion seems to state that so long as the government does not specifically direct an informant, they may engage in any activity
without violating the defendant's due process rights. This becomes an open invitation for law enforcement to employ an informant, suggest to the informant that she "do whatever is necessary" and then successfully disclaim any responsibility for the
informant's conduct. 163
It is apparent from the decisions handed down by the Ninth
Circuit, that the court is seeking to narrow the due process, outrageous conduct defense. However, since the defense has been
specifically recognized by the Supreme COurt,l64 the Ninth Circuit is either unwilling or feels unable to eliminate it. Perhaps
the court should examine more closely the possibility of invoking
its supervisory power as an independent means for the judiciary
to deal with "outrageous" police activity. This view was expressed by the dissent in Hampton 166 and perhaps should be reexamined by the federal courts as an effective way to limit inap158. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1468.
159. ld.
160. ld.
161. ld.
162. ld.
163. The court reserved judgment on whether the use of sex by a police officer
would be a violation of due process. ld. at 1468 n.4.
164. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Hampton v. United States, 425
U.S. 484 (1976).
165. Hampton, 425 U.S. 484, 500 nA. See supra note 54 for facts.
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propriate police activ.ity in cases involving informants. I66
Thus, although Simpson is in accord with decisions in both
this circuit and others, it leaves the meaning and application of
the due process defense undefined, and provides an open invitation for law enforcement officers to use informants in order to
escape a due process challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Simpson I67
does nothing to aid the district courts in the application of the
due process outrageous conduct defense. Thus, the future of the
defense is still unclear. However, it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court will hear a due process outrageous conduct challenge at
any point in the near future since the court of appeals decisions
all appear to be in accord with one another.
The Ninth Circuit appears to be subtly attempting to limit
the due process defense to situations involving physical violence
and coercion. If that is the intent of the court it should make
that point sufficiently clear to the district courts to discourage
the relatively large number of these cases which are heard on
appeal.
Unfortunately, due to the broad language used by the court,
the opinion in Simpson could be construed to mean that law
enforcement officers will rarely be held accountable for the actions of informants. As such, the Simpson opinion will likely be
seen cited in many government briefs in cases where the government has used an informant in a questionable manner.

Veronica A. Franz Gundred*

166. For a discussion of the invocation of the court's supervisory powers, see United
States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1983); R ALLEN AND R KUHNS, CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE p. 792 (1985); and Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in

Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal
Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984).
167. 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987).
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989.
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WILCOX v. FIRST INTERSTATE BANK:
CONTINUING TO EXPAND CIVIL RICO
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank,! the Ninth Circuit held
that commercial borrowers could maintain an action against
their banks based on a claim of mail fraud under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),2 even though
the banks had defeated borrowers' claim of fraud in a related
state action. 3
The Ninth Circuit also held that commercial borrowers did
not present sufficient evidence of an illegal trade agreement between banks to fix their prime interest rates in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act;'
In reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment
on the RICO claim, the Ninth Circuit established that a preponderance of evidence is required for proof of predicate acts in
civil RICO litigation:'s Thus, the burden of proof for fraud in
RICO cases is less than the clear and convincing standard which
is frequently required in proving common law fraud. 6
The court also followed the Supreme Court rule of Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CO.,7 and held that a RICO claim need not
allege an injury separate from the predicate act itself.S In addition, the Ninth Circuit clarified its interpretation of the terms
1. 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Skopil, J.j the other panel members were Nelson, J., and Boochever, J., dissenting in part).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See infra text accompanying notes
41-85.
3. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 530-32.
4. [d. at 528, discussing the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 23-40.
5. [d. at 528, 531.
6. [d. at 531 & n.7. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
7. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). See discussion infra note 57.
8. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 529.
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"person" and "enterprise" as required for pleading a RICO
claim.9
Civil RICO litigation has experienced explosive growth in
the 1980's primarily because RICO has been used as a weapon
against ordinary business fraud, rather than against organized
crime as was originally intended.1o This note will examine some
of the issues raised in Wilcox which have caused problems for
the courts interpreting civil RICO, and which have led to its
broad application.
II. FACTS

Wilcox l l involved commercial borrowers (plaintiffs) who
9. Id. at 529-30.
10. For a good discussion of the early development of civil RICO, see The Report of
the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, 1985 A.BA SEC. CORP. BANKING & Bus. LAW 1, 55
[hereinafter Ad Hoc Report], which reported only nine civil RICO cases in federal district courts between 1970 (RICO's enactment) and 1980, and approximately 260 between
1980 and 1985 (publication of the Ad Hoc Report).
11. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 522. Wilcox consisted of three consolidated actions. Id. at
523-24 & n.l. The three actions were:
(1) Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, CA No. 85-3640, DC No. 81-1127-RE. Id. at 524
n.l. Plaintiffs were a husband and wife, their real estate development company, and a
limited partnership of which the husband was the general partner. Wilcox Dev. Co. v.
First Interstate Bank, 590 F. Supp. 445, 447 (D. Or. 1984). They executed a $2.5 million
promissory note in early 1978 on a loan to build a residential development in Wilsonville,
Oregon. Id. The agreed interest rate was two percent above the prime rate. Id. A mortgage on the property and a personal note were given as security. Id. Plaintiff defaulted
on the note, whereupon defendant foreclosed and bought the property at a sheriff's sale.
Id.;
(2) Kunkle & Stone, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank, CA No. 85-3644, DC No. 83-1766RE. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 524 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff was a
dissolved Oregon corporation. Brief for Appellant at 6, Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank,
815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987) (Nos. 85-3640, 85-3642, 85-3644). The corporation had executed an $8 million note in August 1978 to finance construction of the Shenandoah Hotel
in Las Vegas, Nevada. Id. The agreed interest rate was three percent above the prime
rate. Id. at 6-7. In July 1979, plaintiff executed a second note for an additional $4.5
million with the same terms. Id. at 7. In July 1980, plaintiff sold the hotel, paid all
accrued interest, and had the buyer assume the note. Id.;
(3) Montgomery v. First Interstate Bank, CA No. 85-3643, DC No. 83-1909-RE. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 524 n.l. Plaintiffs were husband and wife. Brief for Appellant at 6,
Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987) (Nos. 85-3640, 85-3643, 853644). They executed a $300,000 note in December 1979 for development of a residential
subdivision in Lebanon, Oregon. Id. The agreed interest rate was two percent above the
prime rate. Id. Plaintiff defaulted and defendant filed foreclosure proceedings. Id. Final
judgment had not been entered upon submittal of plaintiffs' appellate brief to the Ninth
Circuit. Id.;
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had arranged loans with banks (defendants}.12 The plaintiffs'
promissory notes provided for interest on the loans to accrue at
a variable rate of one to three percent above the defendants'
prime rate. 13 Before the 1970's, all commercial loans were based
on the defendants' published prime rate. 14 In the 1970's, however, major borrowers were able to obtain loans at sub-prime
rates/II while plaintiffs and other so-called "middle market" borrowers were still required to negotiate based on the prime rate. 16
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants misrepresented their prime
rate as the best available rate as part of their scheme to defraud
plaintiffs.17 Plaintiffs claimed that defendants committed mail
fraud l8 in violation of RICO by using the mail to assess and collect excessive interest charges based on defendants' misrepresentations. 19 Plaintiffs further claimed that the defendants conspired with one or more other banks to set the prime rate at a
uniform, non-competitive level in violation of the Sherman
Act. 20
A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on the antitrust claim,
but the district court overturned the verdict by entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV}.21 The district court
also granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
RICO claims.22
A fourth action, Kunkle v. First Interstate Bank, CA No. 85-3641, DC No. 82-754RE, was dismissed upon a settlement order. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 524 n.l.
12. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 523-24 & n.2. The defendant/appellee in all the cases was
First Interstate Bank of Oregon (FIOR). FIOR's corporate parent, First Interstate
Bancorp, was an additional defendant in Wilcox only. Id.
13. Id. at 524.
14. Id. at 527-28.
15. Id. at 528.
16. Id. at 524.
17. Id. at 528. See also Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 590 F. Supp. 445,
447-48 (D. Or. 1984).
18. Mail fraud is a federal crime which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). See
discussion infra note 51.
19. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1987).
20. Id. at 524. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants conspired with one or more of six
other banks: First Interstate Bank of California, First Interstate Bank of Arizona, First
Interstate Bank of Nevada, First Interstate Bank of Washington, Bank of America, and/
or United States National Bank of Oregon. Brief for Appellant at 7, Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987) (Nos. 85-3640, 85-3643, 85-3644).
21. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 605 F. Supp. 592 (D. Or. 1985) (grant of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or alternatively, new trial on antitrust claims).
22. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 523 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Wi!-
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III. BACKGROUND
A.

ANTITRUST

The Sherman Act23 was passed in 1890 to safeguard the role
of competition in the economy.24 Section 1 of the Act prohibits
"every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce .... "211 In the landmark case of Standard Oil
Co. v. United States,26 the Supreme Court stated that all trade
agreements restrain trade to some degree, and that only agreements which unreasonably restrain trade are illegal. 27 Therefore,
to succeed in a section 1 claim a plaintiff must establish: (1) an
agreement; (2) which is intended to unreasonably restrain trade;
and (3) which actually harms competition.28
The courts have employed two methods for determining
whether an act or agreement is unreasonable, the "per se rule"
cox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 590 F. Supp. 445 (D. Or. 1984) (summary judgment on RICO claim).
23. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-? (1982).
24. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-77 (1984).
See also United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972): "Antitrust laws in
general and the Sherman Act in particular are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." See
generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 5-11 (1977); 7 P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAW §§ 1500-11 (1986); 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (E. Kintner ed. 1978).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
26. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Standard Oil had acquired the stock of many other oil companies in order to gain control of petroleum commerce. [d. at 75-77. This action was found
to be unreasonable because it was a concerted effort to gain a monopoly. [d. Accord
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-90 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977). But ct. Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (it was not unreasonable for the Board
of Trade to limit the time when trading could take place).
27. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
28. Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 605 F. Supp. 592 (D. Or. 1985).
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and the "rule of reason."29 Under the per se rule, some agreements are so blatantly anticompetitive as to be deemed illegal
per se.30 The leading example is an agreement to fix prices.31
Other agreements, such as mergers and joint ventures, have
some potential for increasing competition and must be more
closely examined for their impact on the market. 32 Using the
rule of reason, the court will examine evidence of the agreement's actual effect on competition, then weigh the agreement's
tendency to enhance competition against its tendency to injure
competition.33
Plaintiffs need not prove the agreement by direct evidence.34 Circumstantial evidence may suffice if it supports a reasonable inference of a conscious agreement to attain an illegal
objective.311 But, the evidence must also tend to exclude the pos29. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at §§ 63-67; 7 P. AREEDA, supra note
24, at §§ 1500-11.
30. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). See
also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-23 (1940), where the
Court held that a concerted effort by major oil producers to control the oil market was
illegal per se. In Socony, the major oil producers engaged in spot buying of gasoline at
distressed prices from independent producers. ld. at 155. The independents had insufficient capacity to hold inventories, thus the major producers, by controlling inventories,
were able to hold market prices at levels the majors found desirable. ld. The Court found
this practice offensive, stating that "a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate commerce is illegal per se." ld. at 221-23. Earlier cases had developed the
concept of inherently non-competitive activity without using the "per se" label. See, e.g.,
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at §§ 67,70-75:
"[T]he per se rule against price fixing applies to any agreement among competitors
which, in purpose or effect, directly or indirectly inhibits price competition." ld. at 198.
31. See cases cited supra note 30.
32. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768.
33. ld. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (the classic ruIe
of reason case), discussed supra at note 26. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at
§§ 68-69, 72: "[C]ompetition [is] the ruIe of trade which cannot be put aside, however
reasonable doing so may seem in particular instances." ld. at § 65, at 172.
34. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 525 (1987). See also Wilcox Dev.
Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 605 F. Supp. 592, 594 (D. Or. 1985), quoting American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946) (An agreement may be inferred from the "course of dealing or other circumstances as well as the exchange of
words."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Servo Co., 391 U.S.
253 (1968); Weit v. Continental Illinois Nat'} Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
35. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 525, quoting T.W. Elec. Servo Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1987). See also cases cited supra note 34.
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sibility of independent action. 36
The Ninth Circuit has employed a series of "plus factors" to
determine whether an agreement may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 37 The test was announced in C-O-Two Fire
Equipment Co. v. United States. 3S Under this test, the totality
of the factors, such as parallel conduct (price and product uniformity), exchanges of price information, and meetings which
could provide an opportunity to form industry-wide policies, are
examined to see if they reasonably support an inference of conspiracy.39 The inference of agreement must be "reasonable in
light of the competing inference of independent action ...."40
B.

RICO

RICO was passed as part of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.41 Congress intended that RICO be used to fight organized crime and its influence on legitimate businesses by providing new remedies, including potential treble damages and attorney's fees for successful civil claims.42 However, RICO has
36. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 525. See also Matsushita, 475 U. S. at 574; Monsanto, 465
U.S. at 764; Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1985); Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 111.
37. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 525-26.
38. 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). Defendants were
convicted of conspiring to fix prices and terms and conditions for sale of fire extinguishers. Id. at 490. The government introduced evidence that defendants had: (1) regularly
maintained virtually identical price lists; (2) instructed dealers to adhere to price lists;
(3) policed dealers to assure adherence; (4) submitted identical bids which conformed to
price lists. Id. at 491-92.
39. Id. at 493:
[T]he trial court, sitting as the trier of the facts, regarded this
evidence as being one in a series of "plus factors" which, when
standing alone and examined separately, could not be said to
point directly to the conclusion that the charges of the indictment were true beyond a reasonable doubt, but which, when
viewed as a whole, in their proper setting, spelled out that irresistable conclusion.
40. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 526, quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith, 475 U.S.
574, 577 (1986). See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 24, §§ 63-67.
41. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, tit. IX, Pub. L. No. 91-452 §§ 901-02,
84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp.
IY 1986». For a good discussion of legislative history, see Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L. Q. 1009 (1980) and Ad Hoc Report, supra note 10.
42. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981): "[L]egislative history forcefully
supports the view that the major purpose of [RICO] is to address the infiltration of
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been used primarily against ordinary commercial fraud. 43 This
has led to considerable controversy over the scope of the RICO
statute.44
RICO makes it unlawful for any person to: (1) invest the
profits of a racketeering activity in an enterprise (section
1962(a»;4lS (2) acquire or maintain any interest in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity (section 1962(b»;46 or
(3) conduct the business of an enterprise through a pattern of
legitimate business by organized crime." Id. at 591. Congress expressed their intent when
they enacted The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452 §§ 901-02, 84
Stat. 922-23: "It is the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime ...
by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime." See also Ad Hoc Report, supra note 10, at 55; Blakey
& Gettings, supra note 41, at 1014-22; Kennedy, Civil RICO in the Antitrust Context, 55
ANTITRUST L. J. 463 (1987).
43. Ad Hoc Report, supra note 10, at 2.
44. See generally Ad Hoc Report, supra note 10; Kennedy, supra note 42, at 465;
Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REv. 827, 840-48
(1987); Note, Clarifying Civil RICO: Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV.
189 (1986); Boucher, Closing the RICO Floodgates in the Aftermath of Sedima, 31
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (1986); Black, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) - Securities and Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Fraud after Sedima:
What is a "Pattern of Racketeering Activity"?, 6 PACE L. REV. 365 (1985-86); Smith &
Metzloff, RICO and the Professionals, 37 MERCER L. REV. 627 (1985-86); Moran, The
Meaning of Pattern in RICO, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 139 (1985); Abrams, The Place of
Procedural Control in Determining who may sue or be sued: Lessons in Statutory Interpretation from Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1477 (1985); Wood, Civil RICO
- Limitations in Limbo, 21 WILLAMETI'E L. REV. 683 (1985); Note, Civil RICO and the
Prior Criminal Conviction Requirement: Has the Second Circuit Drawn the Net Too
Tightly?, 60 WASH. L. REv. 461 (1984-85); Hirschberg, Arnold & Towers, The Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act: A Peek into Pandora's Box, 57 WIS. BAR BULL.
11 (1984).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.
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racketeering activity (section 1962(c».47 A conspiracy to violate
any of these sections is also unlawful (section 1962(d».48
The statute focuses on "racketeering activity", which is defined as any of a long list of state and federal crimes, including
mail and wire fraud. 49 These prohibited acts are commonly
47. 18

u.s.c. § 1962(c) (1982) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
an unlawful debt.
Thus, the elements of a RICO claim are: (1) a person; (2) a pattern of racketeering
activity; (3) an enterprise in interstate commerce; (4) a relationship between the person
and the enterprise which violates section 1962; and (5) an injury to business or property.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) defines the terms of the statute, providing in section 1961(1):
"[Rlacketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B)
any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: sections 201 (relating to
bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471,
472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating
to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under
section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement
from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to
extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating
to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections
1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating
to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction
of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating
to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section
1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of
wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful
welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to prohibition
of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the
laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to
engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from
specified unlawful activity), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating
to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988

29

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 7

1988]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

111

called "predicate acts" because they form the basis for a RICO
claim. Mail and wire fraud are the predicate acts which are most
frequently the basis for a RICO claim.lIo They are two of the
broadest federal criminal statutes, requiring only (1) a scheme to
defraud, and (2) foreseeable use of the mail or wire in furtherance of the scheme.1I1 Prior to RICO, no federal statute provided
a private damage remedy for victims of mail or wire fraud. 1I2
The statute defines a "pattern" as at least two predicate
acts committed within ten years of each other.1I3 An "enterprise"
2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen
property), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain motor
vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating
to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-2424 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable
under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with
restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds),
(D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under
title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling,
or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
punishable under any law of the United States, or (E) any act
which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.
50. Ad Hoc Report, supra note 10, at 18, 57, 243; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A MANUAL
FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, RICO, at 12 (1985).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) prohibits mail fraud, providing in part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud . . . for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post
office or authorized depository ... or takes or receives therefrom . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982) prohibits wire fraud, providing in part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud ... transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television ... any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
See also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954): "It is not necessary that the
scheme contemplate the use of the mails as an essential element."
52. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1979) (mail
fraud); Bell v. Health-Mor Inc., 549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977); Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974) (wire fraud), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); See generally Ad Hoc Report, supra note 10, at 239.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) provides that a pattern of racketeering activity "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
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is broadly defined to include almost any person or group.1I4 A
"person" includes any individual capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property.1I11
Congress expressly directed that "RICO should be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."116 In the
landmark case of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.lmrex Co./7 the Supreme
Court stated that "RICO is to be read broadly."118 However, the
Court also acknowledged that RICO is evolving into something
quite different from what Congress envisioned. 1I9
The Ninth Circuit first considered civil RICO in Rae v.
Union Bank,60 where a RICO claim under section 1964(c) was
dismissed by the district court due to a failure of the pleadings
to adequately state the claim.61 Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the person who committed the predicate act was
also the affected enterprise.62 The Ninth Circuit, however, imposed the limitation that the enterprise could not be the RICO
defendant. 63 This limitation has been consistently imposed by
most courts for section 1962(c) claims. 64
date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) provides that an enterprise "includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) provides that a person "includes any individual or
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
56. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 904(a), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
941, 947 (1970) (liberal construction clause).
57. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). A Belgian company, Sedima,
contracted with a domestic firm, Imrex, to ship electronic parts to Europe with both
firms sharing in the profits. Id. at 483-84. Sedima claimed that Imrex was committing
mail fraud by sending inflated bills. Id. at 484. Thus, mail fraud was the predicate act for
a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). Id. While the case was remanded to
allow amendment of pleadings, the Court rejected the need to allege a racketeering enterprise injury, or to show a prior criminal conviction of the predicate act. Id. at 500.
58. Id. at 497.
59. Id. at 500.
60. 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984). A series of loans, extensions, and modifications
finally resulted in default by the plaintiff and foreclosure by the defendant on plaintiff's
real property. Id. at 497. The court found that plaintiff's complaint: (1) failed to allege
that defendants were associated with an enterprise; (2) failed to identify the enterprise;
(3) failed to allege a predicate act. Id. at 480-81.
61. Id. at 479. See supra note 60.
62. Id. at 481.
63. Id.
64. See Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
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Claims under sections 1962(a) and (b) were considered by
the Ninth Circuit in Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv- Well
Furniture CO.615 The court held that under these sections the
person and the enterprise could be the same. 66 The court relied
on the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust CO.67 In Haroco, the court looked to
the language of the statute68 and the underlying policies of
RICO in determining that a person and an enterprise must be
separate entities in a section 1962(c) claim, even though a corporation could fit both statutory definitions.69 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that section 1962(c) requires the liable person be employed by or associated with an enterprise, which implies that
the person must be distinct from the enterprise.70 Sections
1962(a) and (b), however, provide no such close relation between
the person and the enterprise.71 Thus, under section 1962(a) the
liable person may be a corporation using the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in its operations.72 Similarly, under
section 1962(b) the liable person may be a corporation that engages in racketeering activity to obtain or further its controlling
denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); B. F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34
(3d Cir. 1984); Haroco Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982),
eert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Bennet v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061-62 (8th Cir.
1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part in reh'g en bane, 710 F.2d 1361 (1983), eert. denied,
464 U.S. 1008 (1983). Contra United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982),
eert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983) (A corporation may simultaneously be both a defendant and the enterprise under section 1962(c».
65. 806 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff was the exclusive distributor for defendant's appliances in Southern California. Id. at 1395. He claimed that defendant diverted
appliances intended for sale in other areas into plaintiff's exclusive area. Id. The court
held that a claim under section 1962(a) or (b) allows the enterprise to be named as a
defendant. Id. at 1398.
66.Id.
67. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). This
case was decided on the same day as Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
68. See supra note 47.
69. Haroeo, 747 F.2d at 400.
70. Id. at 400-02.
71. Compare the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982), supra note 45, with that of
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982), supra note 46, and that of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982), supra
note 47. Section 1962(c) prohibits activity by a RICO person who is somehow affiliated
with the RICO enterprise, whereas sections 1962 (a) and (b) prohibit certain types of
activity by a RICO person, regardless of their relation to the RICO enterprise. "Subsection (a) does not contain any of the language in subsection (c) which suggests that the
liable person and the enterprise must be different." Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402.
72.Id.
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interest in its own enterprise.73 In both instances, however, it is
important to note that the corporation is the beneficiary of the
pattern of racketeering activity.74 The court found this to be a
reasonable result because RICO is intended to reach those who
benefit from racketeering, not those who are victimized by it.711
Other courts have sought to impose additional limitations
on RICO claims.78 The Second Circuit had required that plaintiffs show that there was an injury other than that caused by the
predicate act, a so-called "racketeering enterprise injury."77 This
requirement was analogized to the antitrust requirement that a
competitive injury be shown.78 This notion was clearly rejected
in Sedima, where the Court held that the predicate act by itself
constituted the compensable injury.79
Another limitation rejected in Sedima was a requirement
73. Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th
Cir. 1986), quoting Pennsylvania v. Derry Construction Co., 617 F. Supp. 940, 943 (W.D.
Pa. 1985): "Logic dictates that a corporation, receiving income from a pattern of racketeering activity in which it has participated as a principal, can invest that income in its
own operations."
74. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402: "This approach to subsection (a) thus makes the corporation-enterprise liable under RICO when the corporation is actually the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, but not when it is merely the
victim, prize, or passive instrument of racketeering."
75. Id.
76. The First Circuit was overruled when it tried to limit the application of RICO to
legitimate businesses. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd,
452 U.S. 576 (1981) (Neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its application to
legitimate enterprises). Ct. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (No distinction between a corporation that elects its officers
and holds annual meetings, and a similar structure that controls secret criminal networks). For a good discussion of how the federal courts of appeal have tried to limit
RICO, see Ad Hoc Report, supra note 9. See generally Tarlow, RICO Revisted, 17 GA. L.
REV. 291 (1983).
77. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984) (Defendant attempted to conceal assets subject to distribution in a bankruptcy action). Contra Terre
du Lac Ass'n., Inc. v. Terre du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1082 (1986).
78. The requirement for a competitive injury is patterned after section 4 of the
Clayton Act, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). See Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The Supreme Court has held that antitrust claims could only be brought by plaintiffs who were directly injured in their business or property by an anticompetitive agreement. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720 (1977). An antitrust injury is "more than [an] injury causally linked to an
illegal presence in the market." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977).
79. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985).
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that the person must have been convicted of a predicate act in
order be liable under civil RICO.80 The Court pointed to the language of the statute requiring that the predicate acts be indictable, chargeable, or punishable under the.laws enumerated in section 1961.81 The Court stated that this language clearly shows
Congress' intent that a predicate act be one which is subject to
criminal sanction, not one which has already been prosecuted.82
However, the Court in Sedima did point to a limitation regarding the definition of a pattern. 83 The Court suggests that
two isolated predicate acts do not form a "pattern" thus will not
80. Id. at 493.
81. Id. at 481-82.
82. Id. at 481-82, 488-89. In support of this position, the Court notes that Congress
expressly required a conviction prior to seizure of forfeited property in an adjacent section of RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(0 (Supp. IV 1986).
83. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14, where Justice White wrote:
[T]he definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" differs
from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a
pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," §
1961(5) (emphasis added), not that it "means" two such acts.
The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may
not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of anything
do not generally form a "pattern." The legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering do not
constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report explained: "The
target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration
of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which
combines to produce a pattern." S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 158
(1969) (emphasis added). Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate
bill, after quoting this portion of the Report, pointed out to
his colleagues that "[t]he term 'pattern' itself requires the
showing of a relationship .... So, therefore, proof of two acts
of racketeering activity, without more, does not establish a
pattern ...." 116 Congo Rec. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen.
McClellan). See also id., at 35193 (statement of Rep. Poff)
(RICO "not aimed at the isolated offender"); House Hearings,
at 665. Significantly, in defining "pattern" in a later provision
of the same bill, Congress was more enlightening: "criminal
conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have
the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 18
U.S.C. § 3375(e). This language may be useful in interpreting
other sections of the Act. cr. Iannelli V. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 789 (1975).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss1/7

34

Gundred and Nebb: Criminal Law

116 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:103

support a RICO claim. 84 There must be a relationship between
the acts which provides a threat of continued wrongdoing. 85
N. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

ANTITRUST CLAIM

In WilCOX,86 the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
grant of defendants' motion for JNOV on the antitrust claim. 87
Using the rule of reason88 and the "plus factors" test,89 the court
evaluated each of four factors offered by the plaintiffs and the
defendants' explanations to determine whether an inference of
conspiracy was reasonable in light of the competing inferences of
independent action.90
First, the plaintiffs relied on parallel movement of defendants' prime rate with other banks.91 The defendants did not
deny parallel movement.92 The Ninth Circuit has consistently
held that parallel conduct without more is insufficient to establish an inference of conspiracy.93 Further, the Supreme Court
has held that it is not unlawful for a firm to independently fol84.Id.
85.Id.
86. 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987).
87. Id. at 524, 527. In reviewing the grant of JNOV, the Ninth Circuit applied the
same standard as the district court. Id. at 524, citing Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d
1244, 1252 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 U.S. 1642 (1986). The decision was affirmed
because the evidence could support only one reasonable conclusion. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at
525, citing William Inglis & Sons v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1026
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). However, "the court is not free to
reach a result it finds more reasonable ... if the jury verdict is supported by substantial
evidence." Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 525, citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts
Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986).
88. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
90. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 525-28.
91. [d. at 526.
92. [d.
93. [d. See also Ralph C. Wilson Industries, Inc. v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 794
F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986). In Wilson, a television station (KICU in San Jose, California)
alleged that networks and other independent stations conspired to deny KICU rights to
broadcast programs under certain exclusive licensing agreements. Id. at 1365. KICU suggested that since all defendants exercised exclusivity against KICU, such parallel action
inferred a conspiracy. [d. However, the court acknowledged that similar businesses are
generally conducted alike. Id. It also required that there be more circumstances which
suggest a joint agreement. [d. See also Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co.,
612 F.2d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
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low the prices of an industry leader.94 In Wilcox, the Ninth Circuit pointed to defendants' "count-to-four" method of adjusting
its prime rate. 91S Under this method, when four of seven specific
banks changed their prime rates, the defendants would tOO. 96
The court found this to be a unilateral action which was a convenient and reliable way to remain competitive in the lending
market. 97
Plaintiffs also contended that the defendants' parallel
movement was not motivated by good faith business judgement,
but by a desire to stabilize profits.98 However, the court found
that defendants had presented evidence which showed that
prime-based and sub-prime loans were offered to different classes of borrowers, and that both markets were highly
competitive. 99
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the second factor, exchange of
prime rate information, by distinguishing United States v.
Container Corp. of America/oo in which the conspirators exchanged confidential information as to prices charged to individual customers, rather than a statistical report on the average
cost to all customers. IOI In Wilcox, however, the prime rate information was publically available over the wire services. lo2 Such
disclosure did not support an inference that the defendants conspired to fix their prime rate. I03
The third factor, in-house meetings of defendants, was sum94. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1927), quoting United States v. Steel Corporation, 251 U.S. 417, 448 (1920): "[TJhe fact that competitors may see proper, in the exercise of their own judgment, to follow the prices of
another manufacturer, does not establish any suppression of competition or show any
sinister domination."
95. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1987).
96. Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 605 F. Supp. 592, 595 (D. Or. 1985).
97. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1987).
98. Id. at 527-28.
99. Id. at 528.
100. 393 U.S. 333 (1969). Container Corporation shipped about ninety percent of
the corrugated containers in the Southeastern United States. Id. at 336. They exchanged
information with competitors as to the most recent prices charged to customer groups.
Id. at 334-36. The Court held that this practice had the effect of stabilizing prices, and
price controls are illegal. Id. at 337-38.
101. Id. at 334.
102. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1987).
103. Id. at 527.
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marily dismissed by the court because plaintiffs offered no evidence of any agreement to set prime rates at the meetings. 1M
The fourth factor was outside meetings of industry officials. lo5 The Ninth Circuit found analogous the facts of Weit v.
Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust CO.I06 In Weit, bank
credit card holders claimed that five banks conspired to fix interest rates on credit card purchases. lo7 The cardholders
presented evidence of industry meetings to support their claim,
but the Seventh Circuit held that the meetings provided an effective means of cooperation in establishing a compatible credit
card system.106 In Wilcox, there was a similar need for officials
to meet to agree on terms for participation loans. lo9
Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that defendants' explanations showed a reasonable possibility of independent action, and
therefore, no illegal agreement could be inferred yo
B.

RICO

1. Majority

The district court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the RICO claim, finding that plaintiffs had not alleged a racketeering enterprise injury, and also that the plaintiffs had sued the enterprise and not the persons who conducted
the affairs of the enterprise. 1ll
The Ninth Circuit began its review with a discussion of
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CO.,112 in which the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the requirement that a RICO plaintiff allege a
racketeering enterprise injury.ll3 The Ninth Circuit had previ104. [d.
105. [d.
106. 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1981).
107. Weit, 641 F.2d at 458.
108. [d. at 462.
109. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 527.
110. [d. at 527-28.
111. [d. at 528-29. The district court denied motions to amend because plaintiffs
alternative theories still alleged that the person and the enterprise were the same entity.
[d. at 529. These two limitations are discussed supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
112. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). See supra note 57.
113. [d. at 495. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
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ously adopted this rule in Simon Oil Co. v. Norman,114 but the
district court's opinions in Wilcox 111i were rendered prior to either of these cases.
The court also discussed the person/enterprise distinction in
civil RICO claims.11s Plaintiffs had alleged violations of sections
1962(a), (c) and (d).117 The Ninth Circuit established in Rae v.
Union Bank,118 that a corporate defendant could not be both the
RICO person and the RICO enterprise in a claim under section
1962(c).1l9 However, in Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv- Well
Furniture Co.ro the Ninth Circuit reasoned that no such distinction was required under sections 1962(a) or (b) as long as the
corporation was the beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering
activity.l21 In Wilcox, the court did not decide this question,
rather they gave plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their pleadings on remand to conform with the requirements of Rae and
Schreiber.122

Lastly, and most significantly, the Ninth Circuit rejected
defendants' argument that collateral estoppel precluded plaintiffs from asserting a mail fraud claim.123 In a related state action, a jury had found against the plaintiffs on a common law
claim that the defendants' prime rate was fraudulent.124 Defendants contended, therefore, that some elements of the mail fraud
claim were disproved. 121i The court did not discuss the elements
114. 789 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986). Defendants promoted and sold interests in oil and
gas development. Id. at 780-81. The RICO claim had been dismissed by the district
court, but the Ninth Circuit reversed to follow Sedima. Id. at 781.
115. Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 590 F.Supp 445 (D. Or. 1984).
116. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 529 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra
text accompanying notes 62-75.
117. Id. at 528.
118. 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra note 62.
119. Id. at 481.
120. 806 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1986). See supra note 67.
121. Id. at 1398.
122. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 1987).
123. Id. at 532.
124. Id. at 530-31.
125. Id. at 530. The court relied on Oregon law to define the elements of the fraud
claim, citing Rice v. McAlister, 268 Or. 125, 128, 519 P.2d 1263, 1265 (1974), which held
that fraud claims in Oregon are shown by: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) an
intent that it be acted upon by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated;
(6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) reliance on its truth; (8) the right to rely
thereon; (9) consequent and proximate. injury.
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of the different fraud claims, but focused instead on the burden
of proof which was required for each claim.126
Civil claims generally must be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. 127 But some claims, including fraud, may require
plaintiffs to meet the increased burden of proving their claims
by clear and convincing evidence. 128 The plaintiffs in Wilcox
were required by Oregon law to prove their common law fraud
claim by clear and convincing evidence.129 However, relying on
dicta in Sedima, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs must
prove RICO predicate acts by a proponderance of the evidence. 13o In fact, the court stated "[w]e have found no civil
RICO cases applying the clear and convincing standard of proof
for predicate acts. m31 Having adopted a preponderance standard, collateral estoppel could not apply because the burden of
proof was less in the RICO action than in the common law fraud
action. 132

2. Dissent
Judge Boochever, dissenting in part, believed that the court
should adopt the standard which applied in the corresponding
state cause of action for fraud. 133 He claimed that the dicta in
Sedima was unclear as to whether a preponderance standard is
appropriate in all RICO claims:
We are not at all convinced that the predicate
acts must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt in a proceeding under § 1964(c). In a number of settings, conduct that can be punished as
criminal only upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt will support civil sanctions under a prepon126. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 531.
127. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 339 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; 21 C.
WRIGHT & K GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5122 (1977 & Supp. 1987).
128. MCCORMICK, supra note 127, at § 339; 21 C. WRIGHT & K GRAHAM, supra note
127, at § 5122.
129. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 531.
130. Id. at 531-32. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985).
Accord Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1987); Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v.
SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986).
131. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 531.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 532 (Boochever, J., dissenting in part).
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derance standard.... There is no indication that
Congress sought to depart from this general principle here.... But we need not decide the standard of proof issue today.134

The Second Circuit recently proposed in Cullen v. Margiotta,1315 that the appropriate statute of limitations in a civil
RICO claim was the limitation period for the corresponding
state cause of action. 13S The Wilcox dissent proposed that the
same method was appropriate for establishing the burden of
proof for RICO predicate acts. 137 In most civil cases, a preponderance of the evidence standard would thus be required, but in
some special cases, such as fraud, clear and convincing evidence
might be required. 13s
The dissent also claimed that it would be inconsistent to
allow a fraud claim as the basis of both state and federal actions,
based on the same set of facts, yet having different burdens of
proof. 139 In Wilcox, however, the plaintiffs were allowed to do
just that. They failed to prove their common law fraud claim
under state law, but on remand they would be allowed to try the'
same set of facts at a lesser burden of proof for a potential treble
damage award in a federal RICO action. 140
Lastly, the Wilcox dissent cites approvingly Judge Kennedy's concurring opinion in Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv134. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491.
135. 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1987) (Coercive solicitation of political contributions).
136. Id. at 717-27. However, the Supreme Court recently decided in Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987), that the appropriate statute of
limitations was four years by analogy to the Clayton Act.
137. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 533 (9th Cir. 1987). In fact, the
Ninth Circuit has looked to the law of the forum state in determining the appropriate
limitations period. See Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984).
138. In most states, civil actions require a preponderance of the evidence to succeed.
Fraud is the major exception, usually requiring clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g,
21 C. WRIGHT & K GRAHAM, supra note 127, at 557-58; MCCORMICK, supra note 127, at §
339.
139. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 534. See also Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375 (1983) (Action for fraud in the sale of securities). "Concerned that claims would be
fabricated, the chancery courts imposed a more demanding standard of proof. The
higher standard subsequently received wide acceptance in equity proceedings to set aside
presumptively valid written instruments on account of fraud." Id. at 388 n.27.
140. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 534.
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Well Furniture CO.141 Judge Kennedy stated that the vast scope
of mail fraud as a criminal act can be checked by the existence
of prosecutorial discretion in criminal cases. 142 No such check
exists in private actions under RICO.143 Before RICO, there were
no damages available as a civil remedy for an act of mail
fraud. 144 However, private entities now have an unchecked potential to strike a blow to their competition, a weapon unforeseen by Congress when they enacted RICO.145

v.

CRITIQUE

The Ninth Circuit's opinion in WilCOX l46 shows a stark contrast in the court's handling of the antitrust claim and the RICO
claim. In dealing with the antitrust claim, the court applied
sound logic and moderation in using the rule of reason. However, in light of considerable judicial disagreement as to the
scope of RICO and the many calls for reform,147 the court failed
to take advantage of an opportunity to place a rational limitation on a statute that has grown beyond what was intended. 148
The Ninth Circuit was bound to follow the holdings of
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CO.149 As applied to Wilcox, this
meant that there was no requirement that plaintiffs plead and
prove a racketeering enterprise injury, a holding which the
Ninth Circuit had already followed in Simon Oil Co. v.
Norman. 150
However, the distinction drawn between the statutory language of sections 1962(a), (b) and (c) needs closer examination.
The Ninth Circuit focused on the fact that the language of section 1962(c) spells out a closer relationship between a person
141. 806 F.2d 1393, 1402 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
142. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 534, quoting Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1402 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A MAUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, RICO,
12 (1985).
143. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 534.
144. See cases cited supra note 52.
145. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 534-35.
146. 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987).
147. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985).
148. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500; Ad Hoc Report, supra note 10, at 56-70.
149. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479.
150. 789 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986).
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and the enterprise than sections 1962(a) and (b).l5l The court
stated that the enterprise may be sued as the beneficiary of a
pattern of racketeering activity under sections (a) and (b), but
not under section (c).1G2 However, all three sections begin with
the phrase, "It shall be unlawful for any person ...." 1113 It may
well be that RICO should be a valuable tool against commercial
fraud, but it was intended to eradicate the influence of organized
crime, and this means criminals and their organizations. 11l4 It
should be obvious that RICO as currently interpreted will continue to be used against legitimate businesses, not against organized crime.
The most startling holding in Wilcox was that a preponderance of the evidence standard must always apply to proof of
predicate acts in civil RICO claims. lllll The Ninth Circuit relied
on dicta in Sedima, but the reliance was misplaced. The Supreme Court did not strongly suggest a preponderance standard,
as the Wilcox court would have us believe.1M Instead, the Supreme Court pointed out only that there are many other types of
activity which are punished as criminal, yet support civil sanctions under a preponderance standard, and Congress made no
indication that under RICO it should be otherwise. lll' Therefore,
a preponderance standard will usually be appropriate as that is
the standard most states apply.lllS However, the Court also
clearly stated that the burden of proof issue was not decided. 11l9
The Wilcox dissent is a logical approach to the proof problem. The primary reason for requiring clear and convincing evidence for fraud is to discourage fabrication of claims.160 The rule
151. See supra text accompanying note 71.
152. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 529 (9th Cir. 1987). See also
Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.
1986); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1986) (Section
1962(a) does not require separate entities, but section 1962(c) does). Accord Masi v. Ford
City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1985).
153. Compare statutes cited supra notes 45-47 (emphasis added).
154. See generally Blakey & Gettings, supra note 41, at 1014-21.
155. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 531-32.
156. Id. at 531.
157. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Inllex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985). See supra text accompanying note 134.
158.Id.
159.Id.
160. See, e.g., Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388 n.27 (1983).
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was such in the Ninth Circuit in the days of federal common
law. lSI But under the broad collection of state and federal crimes
which comprise RICO, fraud is treated differently. Thus, the
same set of facts could be the basis of a criminal charge if
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a common law action if
proved by clear and convincing evidence, and a RICO claim (for
treble damages) if proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
It makes sense to look to the law of the forum state to determine the proper burden of proof for a RICO predicate act,
especially when based on a state crime. Yet the Wilcox majority
made no analysis of this issue. The court settled on the the findings of other district courts, most of which have relied heavily on
the dicta from Sedima. 162
VI. CONCLUSION

It is clear that the courts are struggling to rationally interpret civil RICO claims. The Supreme Court has recognized that
civil RICO claims are being brought almost solely against legitimate commercial enterprises. lss However, the Court also stresses
that any reform must come from Congress. lS4
Reform measures were introduced in the 99th Congress,lSG
161. United States v. California Midway Oil Co., 259 F. 343, 352-53 (S.D. Cal. 1919),
aff'd, 279 F. 516 (9th Cir. 1922), aff'd, 263 U.S. 682 (1923) (clear and convincing evidence
required for fraud).
162. A number of decisions have established a preponderance standard. See Cullen
v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 731 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 279-80 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247
(1986).
163. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985): "It is true that
private civil actions under the statute are being brought solely against such defendants
[legitimate businesses], rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster."
164. Id. at 499-500: "[T]his defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress.... sharing the doubts of the Court of
Appeals about this increasing divergence [growth in scope], we cannot agree with either
its diagnosis or its remedy."
165. The bills introduced in the 99th Congress were: H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1985) (Would change the term racketeering to illicit activity, provide treble damages only to government entities or private litigants who showed a prior criminal conviction, provide double punitive damages in certain specified situations, and provide a four
year limitations period on all civil RICO claims); H.R. 5391, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986);
H.R. 5290, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986); H.R. 4892, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1985); H.R.
3985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2517,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Would require a com-
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and again in the lOOth Congress. 166 The reforms offered have varied, but it seems clear that the two most troublesome aspects of
RICO, notwithstanding the definition of its terms, are the inclusion of mail and wire fraud as predicate acts, and the availability
of treble damages. Any reform must address these issues.
The post-Sedima decisions continue to reflect the broad application of RICO to business fraud. 167 CommerCial enterprises,
such as the banks in Wilcox, are highly likely to use the mail or
phone in conducting their businesses. They are now confronted
by an awesome sword in the hands of private attorney generals:
potential liability for treble damages under RICO. It is true that
fraud is a major problem in commercial transactions. 16S But
RICO was not initially aimed at business fraud. 169 If that is
where the focus must stay then we must reshape the law with
that in mind.
There is, however, one area where the Supreme Court in
Sedima did provide leeway for the lower courts to apply rational
limitations. The Court suggested that a pattern must be more
petitive injury be shown).
166. Bills have been introduced into the 100th Congress: H. 2983, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) (virtually the same as H.R. 5445, passed by the House in the 99th Congress);
S. 1523, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Proposes to change the term racketeering to illicit
activity).
167. See Sun Savings & Loan v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987); California
Architectural Bldg. Prods. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1987);
TeleVideo Sys. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1987); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western
Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987); Blount v. Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151
(5th Cir. 1987); Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1987);
Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986) (a commodities firnI may not be the RICO person
in a claim under § 1962(c»; Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 792 F.2d
341 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987) (by analogy to the Clayton Act, a four
year statute of limitations is appropriate in RICO claims); Superior Oil v. Fulmer, 785
F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Touche Ross &
Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986); Masi v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397
(7th Cir. 1985) (claim under § 1962(a) that a bank used depositor's funds to conduct its
business); Miller v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, 777 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1985); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985) (multiple acts of mail fraud as part of a
single scheme constitute a RICO pattern).
168. Commercial business fraud is a large national problem. A 1984 study estimated
that fraud accounts for losses in excess of $200 billion annually. See U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 42 (1984). See generally Goldsmith,
supra note 44, at 832-38.
169. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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than the commission of two isolated predicate acts. 170 There
must be continuity plus a relationship between the acts, such
that there is a threat of continuing criminal activity.17l
The courts should also recognize other rational limitations,
such as an increased burden of proof for fraud as a predicate act.
It is doubtful that Congress intended to federalize fraud actions
through the passage of RICO.
It is unfortunate, but our experience tells us that Congressional reform is likely to be slow in coming. Thus, the courts
must address the issues arising in civil RICO litigation with reasoned analysis, not blind adherence.

Richard A. Nebb*

170. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 n.14 (1985).
171. [d.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989.
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